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OPPORTUNITY LOST, OPPORTUNITY FOUND: A
PROPOSAL TO AMEND MAINE’S RULE OF
EVIDENCE 404 TO ADMIT “PRIOR ACTS”
EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROSECUTIONS
Tina Heather Nadeau*
“Not a week goes by that we don’t hear of another horrific event. Domestic
1
violence is a cancer that is eating at the fabric of our society.”

I. INTRODUCTION: WHY MAINE, WHY NOW?
In 2008, thirty-one people were the victims of homicide in the state of Maine.2
Even more startling: nineteen of these homicides stemmed from domestic
violence,3 possibly the largest number of domestic-violence-related killings in the
state’s history. This means that nearly 70 percent of Maine’s homicides in 2008
were the result of domestic violence. Each year, the percentage of Maine’s
homicides that derive from acts of domestic violence far exceeds the national or
even the regional average.4 This is more than an anomaly. It is a tragedy. If
Maine is serious about reducing its murder rate and saving the lives of Mainers, the
most obvious place to start would be in curbing homicidal cases of domestic
violence.
Amendments made in 2007 (and implemented in February 2008) to Maine’s

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law; A.B. Bowdoin College, 2001. I
would like to thank my family and friends, as well as my professors, especially Deborah Tuerkheimer,
for all their support and encouragement throughout this process. This Comment is dedicated to Maine’s
domestic violence victims and survivors, as well as the state’s prosecutors who struggle to tell their
stories.
1. Sharon K. Mack, Statewide Forums Tackle Topic of Domestic Violence, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
July 12, 2008, at A1 (quoting James Ross, domestic violence investigator at the Somerset County
District Attorney’s Office). See also David Hench, 2008 Sees Surge in Maine Homicides; Mainers
Should Not Fear That the State is Becoming Less Safe, Authorities Say, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Mar. 1, 2008, at A1.
2. David Hench, Domestic Violence: Progress, Problems; An Analysis Outlines the Areas Needing
Attention, Such as Services for Children Who See Abuse, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 25, 2009, at
B1. See also WCSH6.com, Increase in Homicides Has Experts Looking for Trends,
http://www.wcsh6.com/includes/tools/print.aspx?storyid=98584 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
3. MAINE DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, A REPORT TO THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND PUB. SAFETY FROM THE MAINE DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY PURSUANT TO L.D. 1990 at 2
(2009) available at http://www.maine.gov/dps/Docs/LD%201990%20report.pdf.
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/int_urbtab.htm. In 2005,
intimate homicides accounted for 5.8 percent of all homicides in large cities, while in small cities, the
rate was 11.3 percent. Id. In suburban environments, the intimate homicide rate was 13 percent; and
rural areas, the number spiked to 17.8 percent. Id. See also An Act to Protect Families and Enhance
Public Safety by Making Domestic Violence a Crime: Hearing on L.D. 1627 Before the Joint Standing
Comm. on Criminal Justice & Pub. Safety, 123rd Leg. (Me. 2007) [hereinafter Hearing on L.D. 1627]
(testimony of G. Steven Rowe, then Attorney General of Maine.).
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Criminal Code have criminalized particular instances of domestic violence as
“enhanced” crimes of violence.5 This allows prosecutors to consider “prior acts” of
domestic abuse when deciding how to charge a criminal defendant accused of a
domestic-violence-related crime.6 These new laws additionally provide that
prosecutors may introduce evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in the
sentencing phase of an adjudication, provided that the defendant has either been
found guilty by trial or has plead guilty.7 However, enhanced sentences and the
allowance of evidence of prior acts into sentencing considerations does little to
ensure that more batterers are actually convicted of domestic violence crimes.
Under the revised Criminal Code, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence has
the ability to impact only those batterers who are prosecuted successfully, or who
decide to plead guilty. At trial, however, evidence of a batterer’s prior acts of
violence against his victim cannot be admitted, as they are generally prohibited by
Maine Rule of Evidence 404.8 While the prosecutor and the sentencing judge have
access to such evidence, the most important actors in a jury trial—the jurors—are
not allowed to hear such evidence, view the charged crime in the context of an
abusive relationship, and then render a decision.
The vision of those who first suggested that Maine criminalize domestic
violence is not reflected in the ultimate amendments to the Criminal Code as
adopted by the Maine Legislature.9 Under the original construction of the bill,
domestic violence itself would constitute a crime under Maine law,10 encompassing
a variety of behaviors under its provision and allowing prosecutors to bring forward
evidence that would tend to prove domestic violence as a “course of conduct”
crime.11 Once the initial bill was divided into particularized, temporal, and
incident-specific crimes, the evidentiary benefits of the initial bill, as well as the
bill’s theoretical and practical thrust, were destroyed.12 The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, which promulgates and has power to amend its Rules of Evidence,13
could help address this evidentiary gap between charging and sentencing by
amending its Rules of Evidence to allow for prior acts of violence to be admissible
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, § 207(A) (2008); infra Part IV.
See infra Parts IV.C, V.
Id.
Maine Rule of Evidence 404, in full, reads:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith.
ME. R. EVID. 404.
9. See generally L.D. 1627 (123rd Legis. 2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the legislative history behind L.D. 1627).
13. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-A (2008).
5.
6.
7.
8.
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in domestic-violence-related prosecutions under the exception of acts which tend to
show relationship between the parties. Amending the Rules of Evidence to
construe prior acts of relationship to include a host of behaviors within the
domestic violence context would help revive some of the power of the original
legislation by recognizing that domestic violence is unique and that reducing the
crime of domestic violence to a particularized incident fails to reflect the realities
of battering.
This Comment will first explain the dynamics of domestic violence, focusing
on emerging trends in legal scholarship, which has begun to reflect the social
science behind understanding domestic violence. Next, this Comment will discuss
domestic violence in Maine in order to set the context for the proposed
amendments to the Criminal Code. This Comment will then look at the Criminal
Code amendments themselves, including the reasoning behind them, a behind-thescenes look at the significant changes made during the legislative process of
recommendation and adoption, and the actual and potential effects of these
amendments on the criminal justice response to domestic violence. Thereafter, this
Comment will then move into Maine’s Rules of Evidence, particularly the
development of the State’s jurisprudence surrounding Rule 404, and the evidence
ban on introduction of prior acts to demonstrate propensity to commit domesticviolence-related crimes.
In addition, this Comment will review the results of a survey from some of
Maine’s prosecutors concerning their ability to introduce evidence of prior acts in
domestic-violence-related prosecutions. Moreover, this Comment will argue that
in order to reintroduce much of the power of the original Criminal Code proposals
to the Legislature, the Law Court should amend the Rules of Evidence to specify
that in domestic-violence-related prosecutions, prior acts evidence should be given
broad admissibility as it bears on the relationship between the two parties. Finally,
this Comment will contend that by amending the Rules of Evidence, the Court will
help to better close the gap between charging and sentencing, giving the 2007
domestic violence Criminal Code amendments much of the power they need to
truly be effective in combating domestic violence in the State of Maine.
Maine has a compelling state interest in facilitating the prosecution of repeat
batterers. Several states already have adopted similar evidentiary proposals—but,
as we will see, in a different theoretical framework—because of compelling
interests and public policy considerations in ensuring the effective criminal
prosecution of batterers.14 Domestic violence prosecutions often are hampered by a
host of evidentiary issues, which have become all-the-more pronounced given the
United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Crawford v. Washington15 and

14. See infra Part VI.
15. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding, in general, that “testimonial” out-of-court statements by witnesses
are excluded from evidence under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witnesses are unavailable and
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness; holding, more specifically, that the
admission into evidence of the wife’s out-of-court statements to police officers violated the
Confrontation Clause). See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence
and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the impact of Crawford on
domestic violence prosecutions).
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Giles v. California.16 Evidence-based domestic violence prosecutions, such as
those implemented by the Cumberland County District Attorney’s office, would
benefit from allowing prior specific acts during the guilt phase of the trial and as
additional leverage for prosecutors during plea negotiations with the accused
batterer. Until our criminal code can reflect accurately the realities of domestic
violence—an opportunity lost during the code approval process with the Criminal
Law Advisory Commission in 200717—the best hope victims and prosecutors have
for making domestic-violence-related charges “stick” is to allow the introduction of
prior acts evidence to contextualize the specified incidents criminalized by the
latest code amendments. This Comment argues that by not allowing jurors to
consider incidents of domestic violence within their proper context, domestic
violence will never be truly criminalized in our State.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The term “domestic violence” encompasses a wide variety of behaviors
through which an abusive partner exerts power and control, not all of which
necessarily involve physical violence.18 For example, financial control, property
damage, emotional terrorism, and forced isolation are all non-physical methods that
an abuser employs to subjugate his victim.19 Physical violence is the most obvious
manifestation of the abuser’s attempt at power and control—and the one to which
the criminal justice system most readily responds. “Violence need only symbolize
the threat of future abuse in order to keep the victim in fear and control her

16. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (holding that the doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing,” as adopted by
the California Supreme Court, was not an exception to the Confrontation Clause at the time of the
nation’s founding and is therefore unconstitutional). For a discussion of the potential impact of Giles on
domestic violence prosecutions, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The
Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1288122.
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1351-54. See also infra Part IV.
18. Domestic violence survivor and advocate Ann Jones argues that the term “domestic violence”
obfuscates more than it elucidates. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & HOW
TO STOP IT 81 (2000). “Domestic violence is one of those gray phrases, beloved of bureaucracy,
designed to give people a way of talking about a topic without seeing what’s really going on,” she
writes. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). The phrase “wife torture,” she adds, would help
conjure the scenes between beatings: the sullen husband, withdrawn and sulking, or angry
and intimidating, dumping dinner on the floor, throwing the cat against the wall,
screaming, twisting a child’s arm, needling, nagging, manipulating, criticizing the bitch,
the slut, the cunt who never does anything right, who’s ugly and stupid, who should keep
her mouth shut, who should spread her legs now, who should be dead, who will be if
she’s not careful. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
For the sake of consistency, if not accuracy, I will employ the term “domestic violence” in this
Comment. Throughout this Comment, I will refer to “batterers” as “he” and “victims” as “she.” The
reason for this is to acknowledge the gendered nature of domestic violence, in which 85 percent of
intimate partner violence reported and recorded by law enforcement authorities is perpetuated by men
against women. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003).
19. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G. GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2008).
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behavior.”20
Psychologist Lenore Walker first characterized abusive relationships as being
comprised of three distinct phases in her foundational 1979 work, The Battered
Woman.21 The “Cycle of Violence,” according to Dr. Walker, includes “the
tension-building phase; the acute battering incident; and the tranquil, loving (or at
least non-violent) phase that follows.”22 “During the tension-building phase,”
writes Dr. Walker, “minor battering incidents occur [including] slaps, pinches,
controlled verbal abuse, and psychological warfare.”23 It is during this phase that
the victim tries to placate the abuser, to avoid the inevitable explosion of violence
that will follow it.24 The physical incidents escalate into the “acute battering
incident,” which Dr. Walker characterizes by “rampage, injury, brutality, and
sometimes death.”25 After the acute battering incident comes the “honeymoon
phase,”26 as the batterer feels remorse for his violent behavior and attempts to make
amends with his victim.27 It is during this phase that the victim, if she reported the
acute battering incident to the police, will have contact with the prosecutor, which
often results in recanted statements and an unwillingness to cooperate.28 The
victim often thinks that “things will get better.” But, as Dr. Walker notes, the cycle
of violence will begin again, resulting in more violent and more acute battering.29
The victim may also be unwilling to testify for a multitude of reasons, including
intimidation by the batterer, threats of retaliation, and cultural or familial
pressures.30
According to former domestic violence prosecutor Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer, “[T]he law applied to domestic abuse conceals the reality of an
ongoing pattern of conduct occurring within a relationship characterized by power

20. Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar & Rene Ellis, The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2128 (1993), reprinted in SCHNEIDER, supra note 19,
at 51.
21. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 56 (discussing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
(1980)).
22. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY
RESPONDS 42 (1989), reprinted in SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 56.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 326 (1992).
27. WALKER, supra note 22, at 44.
28. See Walker, supra note 26.
29. WALKER, supra note 22, at 46.
30. Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence for Propensity
Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1126. Additionally,
battered women have a realistic fear of leaving their batterers, as a woman is 75 percent more likely to
be murdered when she tries to flee or had fled the abusive relationship. Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles
to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 28, 1999, at 19-20. Women often stay
in these relationships because they feel it is their safest option. See id. The theory of “separation
assault” was first developed by Martha R. Mahoney in her article, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991) (stating that “separation assault is the
attack on the woman’s body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving,
retaliate for the separation, or force her to return”).
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and control.”31 Professor Tuerkheimer argues that, while outside of criminal law,
domestic violence is understood “as patterned in nature and largely defined by nonphysical manifestations of domination,”32 the traditional criminal law has failed to
adopt this more expansive and inclusive view, instead myopically focusing on
discrete and overt physical acts.33 In so doing, argues Professor Tuerkheimer, the
criminal law as it currently stands is not in a position to either address or remedy
battering.34
Additionally, batterers notoriously are prone to repeat their actions; rates of
recidivism are astonishingly high. Following a study, the American Medical
Association found that 47 percent of batterers beat their partners at least three times
a year, while the recidivism rate for sexual offenders is only 7.7 percent three years
after their convicted offense.35 There seems to be evidence that as the years go on,
batterers grow more brazen, more violent, and more effective at subjugating their
victims. “Many of the violent acts that prompt domestic violence arrests would be
classified as felonies if committed against strangers,” remarked sociologist Evan
Stark, “and most of the men arrested resemble the worst class of felons: they are
repeat offenders, are typically unrepentant, and frequently retaliate against,
threaten, or otherwise intimidate their victims after an arrest.”36 These facets of
repeat batterers’ behavior, contends Stark, “suggest a high-profile crime worthy of
an aggressive criminal justice response.”37
Stark also proposes a model to understand domestic violence that reflects the
31. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 960-61 (2004) (critiquing
traditional criminal law structures as inadequate to address the realities of domestic violence).
32. Id. at 961.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 962, 1018-19. Professor Tuerkheimer proposed in this article a battering statute, which
reads as follows:
A person is guilty of battering when:
He or she intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family or
household member; and
He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result in
substantial power or control over the family or household member; and
At least two acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in this
jurisdiction.
Id. at 1019-20. Professor Tuerkheimer further provides definitions for the following:
“Family or household member,” means spouses, former spouses, adults related by
consanguinity or affinity, an adult with whom the actor is or has been in a continuing
relationship of a sexual or otherwise intimate nature, and adults who have a child in
common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any
time.
“Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct comprised of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
“Crime” means a misdemeanor or a felony.
Id. Professor Tuerkheimer was instrumental in the original drafting of L.D. 1627, calling for the
codification of “domestic violence” as a course of conduct crime.
35. Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of
Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 998 (2000).
36. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 61
(2007).
37. Id.
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work of Professor Tuerkheimer. He writes, “[T]he treatment of abuse as a series of
discrete acts rather than as a unitary phenomenon . . . is an ideological strategy that
should be assessed like any other political choice, by whether its consequences are
benign or harmful, rather than as an objective reflection of reality.”38 Stark further
argues that in viewing specific incidents of domestic violence outside of their
battering context, law enforcement fails to recognize the escalating danger and
frequency of the assaults, which can lead to more severe injury and eventually
death.39 This Author agrees with Professor Stark’s central premise that “[t]he only
way to afford genuine protection to abused women is to provide an enhanced
response predicated on the course of malevolent conduct to which they are being
subjected and their special vulnerability due to sexual inequality.”40 Domestic
violence all-too-often has been relegated to second-class misdemeanor status
within the criminal law. Understanding domestic violence as a course of conduct
crime would cast a more accurate light on the severity and escalating nature of the
conduct within its proper relationship context.
The dynamics of domestic violence lead to often frustrated attempts to
prosecute and convict the perpetrators of the violence. Failure to cooperate can
manifest itself in several ways: victims not feeling comfortable testifying, victims
wanting to “drop charges,” or, in many instances, victims testifying on behalf of
defendants. This reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution can be traced to
many factors: threats of retaliation and intimidation by the defendant; succumbing
to the batterer’s persuasive techniques; convincing the victim that things will get
better; cultural or family pressures to not air dirty laundry or try to work it out; or a
belief that cooperation with the prosecution is useless at best, dangerous at worst.41
As domestic-violence-related crimes see some of the lowest successful prosecution
rates within the criminal justice system, victims’ belief that cooperation is futile has
some grounding in reality.42
In a recent article focusing on domestic violence prosecutions in Maine, Judith
Lewis noted that:
[The] disconnect between domestic violence as defined by the law and domestic
violence as experienced by the battered woman not only misrepresents a battered
woman’s experiences, but also inhibits successful prosecution of batterers by
limiting the prosecution’s ability to present its case and its evidence in the full
43
context of the battering relationship.

Though Lewis was advocating for the admission of expert testimony about
battering in domestic violence prosecutions, her underlying rationale is the same as
that advanced by domestic violence scholars and this Comment: in order for the
jury to understand the charge alleged in such crimes, they have to be allowed
access to evidence of the context and course of the battering relationship.
38. Id. at 94.
39. Id. at 99.
40. Id. at 368.
41. See generally Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2000).
42. Id.
43. Judith Lewis, Setting the Wrong Right: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on Dominance
and Control, 23 ME. B.J. 48, 48 (2008) (footnote omitted).
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The important lesson to draw from the emerging legal commentators’ work is
that domestic violence cannot be understood fully as particularized incidents of
explosive violence. According to domestic violence attorney Fredrica L. Lehrman,
“Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive power and control. This prosecution
theme should resonate from every piece of evidence gathered, every pretrial motion
filed, and every trial strategy employed.”44 As we shall see, the ultimate decision
over the admissibility of such evidence will have far-reaching effects on the
preparation and trial strategy of the prosecutor and ultimately on the success of
prosecuting batterers effectively.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MAINE
Over the past decade, approximately 50 percent of homicides in Maine each
year involve domestic violence.45 In 2005, domestic violence assaults increased by
5.2 percent, according to the Maine Department of Public Safety.46 Also in 2005,
close to 5,500 reported assaults happened between family or household members,
which averages one assault every hour and a half.47 However, underreporting is an
enormous hindrance to compiling accurate data on the actual incidence rate of
domestic violence in the state.
Between the years of 1995 and 2005, reported incidents of domestic violence
in Maine increased by 22 percent; 2006 data show a ten-year high in the number of
reported domestic violence assaults.48 In 2005, domestic violence assaults
represented 46.1 percent of all assaults in Maine, also a ten-year high.49 Weapon
use during domestic violence assaults is also prevalent in Maine. Protection From
Abuse Orders comprise 13 percent of the Maine’s district court civil docket, “but
limitations in Maine’s court system, such as inconsistent safety measures, too few
personnel, and limited access to legal representation” serve as demonstrable
barriers to victim safety throughout the state, particularly in its rural regions.50
According to the STOP Implementation Program, nearly 60 percent of all domestic
violence assaults are perpetrated by adult men against adult women, with 16
percent perpetrated by adult women against adult men.51 Fifteen percent of
reported domestic violence homicides involved children, with 11 percent of
44. Pretrial Motions, Domestic Violence Prac. & Proc. (West) § 7:47 (Aug. 2007).
45. Letter from G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, to the Joint Standing Comm. on Criminal
Justice & Public Safety (May 2, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rowe Letter].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. ME. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY JUSTICE ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, 2007-2010: IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN FOR THE STOP (SERVICES*TRAINING*OFFICERS*PROSECUTORS) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
PROGRAM 13-14 (2006), available at http://www.state.me.us/dps/cjg/docs/VAW0710%20STOP%20
Implementation%20Plan.pdf [hereinafter STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM]. The levels of
reported domestic violence assaults in Maine, from 1995 to 2006, are as follows: 1995: 4,412; 1996:
3,914; 1997: 4,222; 1998: 3,855; 1999: 3,986; 2000: 4,486; 2001: 4,922; 2002: 4,813; 2003: 5,364;
2004: 5,188; 2005: 5,459; 2006: 5,549. Maine Marks, Number of Domestic Violence Assaults in Maine:
1995-2005, http://www.mainemarks.org/indicators2008/indT.html.
49. STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM, supra note 48, at 14.
50. National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Facts: Maine,
http://www.ncadv.org/files/Maine.pdf.
51. STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM, supra note 48, at 15 fig.8.
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domestic violence assaults falling into the “other” category.52 The STOP
committee reports, “With the high share of murders occurring in a domestic
violence setting and the high number of rapes in the state, violence against women
constitutes a significant share of the violent crime in Maine.”53
Perhaps the most disturbing figures of all these reports is data concerning the
percentage of Maine’s homicides that result from domestic violence; the number of
these homicides from Maine’s rural communities is even more startling. In 2008,
Maine saw more than thirty homicides; of these homicides, nineteen of them
stemmed from domestic violence, and four of these homicides involved child
victims.54 Between 1985 and 1995, 44 percent of all homicides in Maine were
linked to domestic violence.55 In the past decade, that number has increased to
nearly 50 percent.56 And though only 40 percent of Maine residents fall into the
category of “rural,” the link between rurality and domestic violence homicide is
undeniable. Between 1990 and 1995, more than 60 percent of all domesticviolence-linked homicides in Maine took place in rural communities.57 From 2000
to 2004, the percentage of rural domestic violence homicides in Maine spiked to
more than 80 percent.58 This tracks closely with the national trend of increased
52. Id.
53. Id. at 17.
54. Megan V. Malloy, “A Terrible Year” for Homicide, KENNEBEC J.-MORNING SENTINEL, Aug.
31, 2008, at A1. Compare this number to 2007, when out of twenty-one total homicides, eight had
domestic violence roots. “Eight individual men murdered eight people in acts of Domestic Violence
homicide from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2007. The Homicide Victims’ relationships to their
murderers are two female intimate partners; three wives; and three mothers.” Maine’s Closed Domestic
Homicides, January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WATCH (Maine Coalition to
End Domestic Violence, Bangor, ME), Jan. 2008 at 2. Also, compare to 2006-2007, when out of
twenty-one total homicides, thirteen had domestic violence roots. “Twelve individual men murdered
thirteen people in acts of Domestic Violence homicide from October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007 . . .
. The Homicide Victims relationships to their murders are 2 female intimate partners; 4 wives; 2
mothers; 2 fathers; 1 daughter; 1 son; and 1 brother.” Maine’s Domestic Homicides, October 1, 2006 to
September 30, 2007, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WATCH (Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence,
Bangor, ME), Dec. 2007 at 2.
55. MAINE COALITION FOR FAMILY CRISIS SERVICES, DOMESTIC ABUSE IN MAINE: DATA PROJECT
1990-1995, at 26 (1996) [hereinafter DATA PROJECT 1990-1995].
56. Rowe Letter, supra note 45.
57. Numbers compiled by Author from data in DATA PROJECT 1990-1995, supra note 55, at 26-32.
Out of nine domestic violence homicides in 1990, six were rural (Steep Falls, Rockport, Lebanon,
Richmond, Dover-Foxcroft, Castine); in 1991, three of eight domestic violence homicides were rural
(Lebanon, Trenton, Peru); in 1992, seven of fourteen domestic violence homicides were rural (Franklin,
Presque Isle, South Hope, Embden [two murders], Houlton, Van Buren); in 1993, six of eleven domestic
violence homicides were rural (Manchester [two murders], Harrington, Monticello, Skowhegan,
Sangerville); in 1994, nine out of eleven domestic violence homicides were rural (Stonington, Breman,
Pittsfield, Lagrange [two murders], Mt. Vernon, Belfast, Sidney, Rockland); and in 1995, seven of ten
domestic violence homicides were rural (Heron, Verona, Brownfield [three murders], Springvale,
Fairfield). Id.
58. Numbers compiled by Author from data in MAINE COALITION FOR FAMILY CRISIS SERVICES,
DOMESTIC ABUSE IN MAINE: DATA PROJECT III, 2000-2004, 47-49 (2005) [hereinafter DATA PROJECT
III]. In 2000, six of six domestic violence homicides were rural (St. Agatha, Swanville, Township 10,
Winthrop, Greenbush, Camden); in 2001, five of five domestic violence homicides were rural
(Jonesboro, Chelsea, Carmel, Tremont, Swan’s Island); in 2002, two of three domestic violence
homicides were rural (Sweden, Milo); in 2003, five of eight domestic violence homicides were rural
(Casco, Lisbon Fall, Fairfield, Sabattus, South Berwick); and in 2004, nine of eleven domestic violence
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percentages of rural intimate partner homicide.59 Not only is domestic violence a
growing problem in Maine, its deadly effects are becoming more frequent and
more alarming for Maine’s rural areas.
Alcohol abuse and its destructive effects are inextricable from domestic
violence incidents in Maine.60 In rural areas, alcohol far outpaces its more
notorious counterparts (cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) in its human toll.
“Nearly 52 percent of adults in Maine report that someone in their family has a
severe alcohol problem. Nearly 100,000 Mainers [or nearly 10 percent] are
considered alcohol abusers or alcoholics.”61 According to national statistics, 80
percent of Maine residents in treatment for substance abuse are addicted to alcohol;
nationally, the percentage is closer to fifty.62 When law enforcement responds to a
domestic violence call in Maine, they know that they are likely going to arrest at
least one drunken person, most often the perpetrator of the abuse.63 Portland Police
Detective Lisa Beecher, responsible for investigating nearly 1,000 domestic
violence incidents each year, has commented that victims often say, “‘If he hadn’t
been drinking, he wouldn’t have hit me.’ In many of the homes [the Portland
Police Department goes] to, there’s an awful lot of alcoholism out there. Alcohol
isn’t the cause of domestic violence, but I don’t think anyone can dispute the fact it
exacerbates the problems that already exist.”64 Cumberland County Deputy
District Attorney Meg Elam reports, “Virtually every domestic [violence] case we
see, there’s alcohol involved.”65 Alcohol abuse and domestic violence in Maine
cannot be separated, and, as the state and nation’s economic situation worsens, the
problem of alcohol and domestic abuse will become more pronounced and deadlier.
Despite increased statewide attention to the problem of domestic violence in
Maine over the past two decades, reported incidents of domestic violence are not
decreasing. Funding for domestic violence crisis groups and education efforts
remains woefully inadequate, and, with the current state budgetary and economic
crisis, many victims cannot access the court system in a meaningful way.66

homicides were rural (Masardis, Waldoboro, Lee, Boothbay Harbor [two murders], Fort Kent, Brooks,
Dixfield, Farmingdale). Id.
59. See Adria Gallup-Black, Twenty Years of Rural and Urban Trends in Family and Intimate
Partner Homicide: Does Place Matter?, 9 HOMICIDE STUD. 149, 163-64 (2005).
60. See Barbara Walsh & Meredith Goad, The Deadliest Drug: Maine’s Addiction to Alcohol:
MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Oct. 19, 1997, at A1; Barbara Walsh, Police Find Drunkenness Feeds
Domestic Violence, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 24, 1997, at A12.
61. Maine Pays Dearly as Families are Ruined by Alcohol Abuse, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Oct.
26, 1997, available at http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/specialrpts/alcohol/d8summ.htm.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. “Nationally, alcohol is found in 50 to 60 percent of domestic violence cases. Studies show
that one-third to one-half of all batterers are reported to be problem drinkers.” Walsh, Police Find
Drunkenness Feeds Domestic Violence, supra note 60, at A12.
65. Id. at A12. See also Barbara Walsh, Drinking Plays Role as Partner in Crime, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Oct. 24, 1997, at A1 (stating that “[n]ationally, rates of domestic violence are nearly 15
times higher in homes where batterers commonly get drunk”).
66. The worsening economic situation will impact domestic violence advocacy in immediate ways.
Executive Director Deborah Shepherd of the Family Violence Project warned that in light of Governor
John Baldacci’s proposed budget cuts, nine of the state’s domestic violence programs might close.
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Domestic violence has reached epidemic levels in the state, and in order to more
fully combat it, advocates in the past several years have attempted to convince
lawmakers that the way Maine criminalizes domestic violence must reflect the
realities of domestic violence.
IV. MAINE’S CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS
A. Impetus for Change
In January 2007, Maine Senate President Beth Edmonds and Maine Coalition
to End Domestic Violence Coordinator Gretchen Ziemer published an editorial in
the Kennebec Journal entitled, “It’s Time for Maine to Make Battering a Crime.”67
“Our current law,” wrote Edmonds and Ziemer, “was not written in such a way to
take into account the pattern of long-term behaviors that constitute domestic
violence.”68 Domestic violence, they contended, is “a matter of power and control,
in which the abusers will do whatever they believe is necessary to maintain control
of their victims. They do this through a series of manipulative and abusive tactics
that develop and occur over time.”69 Furthermore, the authors argued, “[T]he
complete picture of domestic violence is relevant to gaining a full understanding of
the illegal behaviors.”70
Also, Edmonds and Ziemer announced that they were working on legislation,
later known as L.D. 1627, to “allow victims to tell their full story, providing an
accurate view of the abusive behavior. Right now, they can’t and this can result in
difficulty in holding abusers legally responsible for their actions.”71 Edmonds and
Ziemer articulated two major benefits that such legislation could provide: (1) “By
defining and classifying battering as a crime, we will more effectively prosecute
abusers because their numerous acts of abuse will not be ignored”;72 and (2)
“Repeated batterings will provide a foundation for more stringent punishment and a
strong message will be sent to our whole community that domestic violence will
not be taken lightly.”73 With the announcement of their plans, Emonds, Ziemer,
and dozens of lawyers, victim advocates, and legislators began work crafting the
legislation that would become L.D. 1627.
In March 2007, Senate President Edmonds submitted L.D. 1627, “An Act to
Protect Families and Enhance Public Safety by Making Domestic Violence a
Crime,” to the Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety.74
They announced the bill at the Maine Statehouse Hall of Flags on March 15,

Mechele Cooper, What Anti-Violence Budget Cuts Will Look Like, KENNEBEC J.-MORNING SENTINEL,
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://morningsentinel.mainetoday.com/news/local/4870813.html.
67. Beth Edmonds & Gretchen Ziemer, Op-Ed., It’s Time for Maine to Make Battering a Crime,
KENNEBEC J., Jan. 23, 2007, at A5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Edmonds & Ziemer, supra note 67, at A5.
74. See L.D. 1627 (123rd Legis. 2007).
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2007.75 “How many more deaths will it take before we realize whatever it is we’re
doing is not enough?” asked Senator Edmonds.76 According to Senator Edmonds,
the bill would criminalize domestic violence by “get[ting] at the signature aspect of
domestic violence, which is its nature as a course of conduct, not a single event.”77
Laura Harper, director of public policy for Maine Women’s Lobby, reinforced
Senator Edmonds’s remarks:
Because Maine law currently does not define the pattern of violence that battered
women experience as a crime, law enforcement and prosecutors lack a critical tool
for stopping abuse. We know that domestic violence occurs over a period of time
and encompasses a continuum of abuse; now it’s time for the law to recognize that
as well . . . .
...
. . . Currently, Maine prosecutes domestic violence crimes on a case-by-case
basis without regard to the patterned behaviors perpetrators use to maintain a
power and control dynamic. Existing crimes used to prosecute domestic violence
such as assault, criminal threatening, terrorizing, stalking, reckless conduct,
violation of a protection order, and violation of condition of release, are incidentbased and conceive of a crime that occurs in an instant of time. Currently, charges
cannot be elevated to account for more severe cases and do not adequately account
78
for the dynamics of domestic violence.

Co-sponsor of L.D. 1627, Representative Leila Percy, said that if the bill passed,
Maine would be “poised to become the first state in the nation to establish domestic
violence as a crime, with specific sentencing guidelines.”79 Recognizing the input
of attorneys and advocates from across the state, Percy noted that domestic
violence as a course of conduct crime distinguishes it from a “bar room fight. It is
rare for domestic violence to be a one-time, isolated situation.”80 Percy added that
the new crime designation would “take into account the pattern of violence [of
domestic abuse] and . . . provide prosecutors and district attorneys more leverage to
prosecute offenders.”81 Percy also quoted a state prosecutor, who said, “To change
the culture, sometimes you have to change the law.”82 Percy advocated for the
change in law and culture to make “Maine homes safe.”83
Then Attorney General Steven Rowe remarked,
[A]ssault is not the only crime that is regularly occurring in Maine families. The
other crimes involved criminal threatening, terrorizing, stalking and reckless
conduct. While these types of crimes involving family and household members
are commonly referred to [as] crimes of “domestic violence,” there is no crime

75. Susan M. Cover, Lawmakers Take Aim at Domestic Violence, KENNEBEC J., Mar. 16, 2007, at
B1.
76. Id.
77. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of Sen. Beth Edmonds) (on file with author).
78. Id. (testimony of Laura Harper, Director of Public Policy, Maine Women’s Lobby) (on file with
author).
79. Id. (testimony of Rep. Leila J. Percy) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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84

In recognizing that the state’s “current system of accountability is not working,”
Rowe continued to explain that “if an abuser who has a prior domestic assault
conviction commits a second domestic assault, it is clear that he has engaged in a
course of violent conduct that demonstrates a heightened risk of future harm to the
victim.”85 Rowe concluded, “[u]ltimately, this bill is about saving lives.”86
In addition, then Speaker of the Maine House of Representatives Glenn
Cummings acknowledged that “[b]y creating a specific crime [of domestic
violence, then the Criminal Code] will recognize the unique circumstances that
domestic violence presents. Domestic violence is usually not an isolated incident;
it is a pattern of incidents.”87 Pragmatically, Cummings continued, “[i]nstead of
having to prosecute domestic violence only through existing crimes like assault or
criminal threatening [the new crime of domestic violence] will give prosecutors a
defined tool that recognizes the pattern.”88
Also submitted to the Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and
Public Safety were comments from an “i-petition,” in which respondents from
across the state were able to share their views about the need for L.D. 1627.89
According to one response, “We can never reach our full potential in our fight
against domestic violence until all agencies involved recognize the cyclical,
patterned process that abuse follows. Perpetrators will not be held fully
accountable until this legislation is passed and enforced.”90 Another commentator
remarked, “I strongly support LD 1627 to help put teeth into criminalizing abuse
and violence in Maine.”91
Former Co-Chair of the Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence Lois
Galgay Reckitt speaking on behalf of the nine member projects of the coalition,
testified that “[t]he victims of domestic abuse are trapped and persecuted in a
repeating pattern—that our existing criminal justice methodology—dealing with
crime in an ‘incident-based’ way would never fully touch.”92 Moreover, Reckitt
encouraged the Maine Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety to send the
bill, as written, to the Legislature floor with “a unanimous ought to pass.”93
Anne Jordan, Commissioner of the Maine Department of Public Safety, also
supported the bill as originally written.94 She explained that under the current law,
“[W]hen a person is prosecuted and convicted for abusing a household or family
84. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of G. Steven Rowe, then Attorney General of
Maine) (on file with author).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (testimony of Rep. Glenn Cummings, then Speaker of the House) (on file with author).
88. Id.
89. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (comments from i-petition, Help Us Make Domestic
Violence a Crime in Maine!) (on file with author).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of Lois Galgay Reckitt, Maine Coalition to End
Domestic Violence) (on file with author).
93. Id.
94. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of Anne H. Jordan, Commissioner of the Maine
Department of Public Safety) (on file with author).
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member, the resulting conviction is for a crime such as, for example, assault,
terrorizing, or stalking. Undoubtedly a conviction for any one of those crimes is a
serious matter; however, the elements—and even names—of the crimes fail to
appreciate or convey the context in which the crimes were committed.”95 L.D.
1627, testified Jordan, would “ensure that Maine’s statutes not only address
criminal conduct in itself, but also criminal conduct that is committed as part of a
destructive, and all too often lethal, pattern of conduct.”96 In addition, Jordan
predicted that the benefits of passing L.D. 1627 as written would lie in permitting
law enforcement officers “to better appreciate and enforce the laws, allow them to
better track violators and assist in the review and processing of weapons requests
and restrictions under the Federal Violence Against Women Act.”97 Jordan further
testified that members of the Maine Prosecutors Association relayed to her that
their work in “combat[ting] the horrors of domestic violence” would be facilitated
by criminalizing domestic violence.98
Domestic violence survivor and advocate Donna Melanson also submitted
testimony in support of L.D. 1627. Melanson alleged that she was also a victim of
the state’s “present judicial system . . . . [b]ecause our system fails to acknowledge
the abuser’s history of domestic violence.”99 As part of her stirring testimony,
Melanson added that “each court case [involving domestic violence] is processed
as [an] isolated incident. And when we fail to recognize the pattern of domestic
violence as a crime, it changes the way people perceive abuse when it occurs in
intimate relationships.”100 Melanson wrote, “No one can truly understand the
complexity of domestic violence until they live it.”101 This complexity, she
asserted, is not reflected in the narrow way in which incidents of domestic violence
are charged and prosecuted in the state.102
The only recorded dissention against L.D. 1627 came from the Maine
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (MACDL), who argued that domestic
violence was already classified as a crime in Maine and treated “very seriously” by
Maine judges, making this proposal superfluous.103 MACDL focused on the
portion of the bill that would allow for violations of protection from abuse orders to
be a predicate offense to raise the crime classification level to a felony.104
According to MACDL President Walter F. McKee, “Judges are not clamoring at
this time for any more significant opportunities to provide additional jail time for
defendants convicted of assault on family members.”105 Despite this criticism, the
bill rode into committee on a wave of overwhelming support.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of Donna Melanson) (on file with author).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Hearing on L.D. 1627, supra note 4 (testimony of Walter F. McKee, President, Maine
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (on file with author).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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B. The Story Behind the Changes
The legislative intent behind L.D. 1627 was clear: to categorize domestic
violence as a course of conduct crime, thereby recognizing a wide variety of
abusive behavior under its provisions. Such a classification would have allowed
past abusive behavior—broadly construed—to come to light during trial, as this
behavior would be used to prove that the defendant had, in fact, committed
“domestic violence.”
The bill, and the attendant hearings about L.D. 1627, generated much popular
support, as evidenced by statewide media coverage of the bill. Former Portland
Press Herald Editor Jeannine Guttman remarked,
LD 1627 . . . takes an aggressive stance. A series of malevolent phone calls or an
assault on a family member would no longer be prosecuted as just criminal
threatening or assault—they would also be legally considered as “domestic
violence.” Under the bill, those convicted of DV crimes would have a record that
better indicates a criminal history that too often represents a pattern of abusive
106
behavior.

According to Glenn Adams of the Associated Press, “The bill’s prospects appear
good, given its co-sponsorship by nearly half of the Legislature and presiding
officers of the House and Senate.”107 Donna Baietti, executive director of the
Battered Women’s Project in Aroostook County, remarked that the bill would
allow law enforcement to “look at what’s really happening in that household, in
that relationship. It also allows for the crime to address the patterns of behaviors,
abusive behaviors or violent behaviors that are present in abusive relationships.”108
Between the public hearing and the eventual adoption of the bill, however, the
thrust of L.D. 1627 was greatly diminished.
The Criminal Law Advisory Commission’s (CLAC), comprised of nine nonLegislative members appointed by the state attorney general,109 recommendations
changed the bill significantly, functionally gutting it of its intended evidentiary
import and conceptual foundations. “Regarding the structure of the proposed [L.D.
1627],” the committee wrote, “CLAC believes that the ‘catch-all’ nature of the
section as currently drafted is inconsistent with the prevailing structure of the
Criminal Code.”110 According to CLAC, the Maine Legislature had revised the
structure of the criminal code so that each crime was given a specific statutory
citation.111 CLAC argued that the revisions helped an “ongoing computerization
effort, but also had the effect of allowing people to determine the exact nature of
the conduct the defendant engaged in from the caption and citation of a charge.”112

106. Jeannine Guttman, Bill on Domestic Violence Pins a Legal Label on Abusers, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, May 9, 2007, at A5.
107. Glenn Adams, Bill Seeks Crime Designation for Domestic Abuse, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May
4, 2007, at B1.
108. Jennifer Ruth, Lawmakers Sponsor Crime Bill, HOULTON PIONEER TIMES, May 9, 2007, at 1.
109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1352 (2006).
110. Memorandum from the Criminal Law Advisory Comm’n, Memo to the Comm. on Criminal
Justice and Pub. Safety (May 1, 2007) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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CLAC further argued that if the bill was enacted as written, an observer
looking at the conviction would not know the particular crime the defendant
committed without looking at the actual court file.113 In order to alleviate these
concerns, CLAC made a recommendation that completely changed the tenor and
power of the bill. CLAC recommended that rather than adopt L.D. 1627 (or, as it
was proposed, M.R.S.A. section 214) as written, that the bill be amended to create,
for example, a crime of “domestic violence assault” in one section, and a crime of
“domestic violence criminal threatening” in another.114 “While making the
Criminal Code more voluminous, this approach would enhance the goals of
precision and clarity with respect to future convictions under these provisions,”
CLAC’s members contended.115
Ultimately, L.D. 1627 as amended passed unanimously, with the amendments
suggested by CLAC and adopted by the Maine Senate and House.116 As a result,
the following laws were enacted on June 27, 2007, and became effective on
February 1, 2008: 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207-A Domestic Violence Assault;117 17-A
M.R.S.A. § 209-A Domestic Violence Criminal Threatening;118 17-A M.R.S.A. §
210-B Domestic Violence Terrorizing;119 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210-C Domestic
Violence Stalking;120 and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 211-A Domestic Violence Reckless

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Committee Amendment, Criminal Justice and Public Safety, Filing No. S-276, June 11, 2007.
117. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207-A (Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of domestic violence assault if: (A) The person violates section 207 and the victim is
a family or household member . . . .” Id. Under section 207, “a person is guilty of assault if: (A) the
person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury or offensive physical contact to
another person.” Id. § 207.
118. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 209-A (Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of domestic violence criminal threatening if: (A) The person violates section 209 and
the victim is a family or household member . . . .” Id. Under section 209, “[a] person is guilty of
criminal threatening if he intentionally or knowingly places another person in fear of imminent bodily
injury.” Id. § 209.
119. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-B (Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of domestic violence terrorizing if: (A) The person violates section 210 and the
victim is a family or household member . . . .” Under section 210,
A person is guilty of terrorizing if that person in fact communicates to any person a
threat to commit or to cause to be committed a crime of violence dangerous to human
life, against the person to whom the communication is made or another, and the natural
and probable consequence of such a threat, whether or not such consequence in fact
occurs, is:
(A) to place the person to whom the threat is communicated or the person
threatened in reasonable fear that the crime will be committed.
Id. § 210.
120. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-C (Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of domestic violence stalking if: (A) The person violates section 210-A and the
victim is a family or household member . . . .” Under section 210,
A person is guilty of stalking if (A) [t]he actor intentionally or knowingly engages in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person that would in fact cause both a
reasonable person and that other specific person:
(1) To suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm;
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The state’s prosecutors now are bringing charges under the new

C. What Are the Effects of These New Laws?
All these new laws make the domestic violence offenses Class D crimes for
first-time offenders and Class C crimes for repeat offenders.123 The effect of the
new laws in helping to address Maine’s domestic violence crisis has yet to be seen.
However, the enacted criminal laws, the new “domestic violence” crimes, have
eviscerated the intent of and potential benefits that would have grown from
adoption of L.D. 1627 as originally conceived. By refusing to classify domestic
violence as a “course of conduct” crime, CLAC effectively knocked the legs out
from under the original law. The Maine Legislature, which was largely unaware of
the severity of these changes, passed scarecrow legislation.
If the language of the original bill had been retained, all evidence about the
battering relationship would have been admissible, under State v. Friel.124 The
Law Court there held that where it is “an element of the offense the evidence of the
prior [acts] was highly relevant and not excludable under any rule.”125 Since
evidence of the course of conduct aspect of domestic violence has been eliminated
as an integral element of the charge, such prior acts are not automatically
admissible. Therefore, the prosecutor generally cannot introduce such evidence in
her case-in-chief.
Domestic violence is best understood as a cluster of crimes, and the original
construction of the law would have allowed prosecutors to present evidence of a
variety of illegal acts under the label “domestic violence.” However, the laws as
they now stand focus, once again, on discrete acts, divorced from the context of the
battering relationship. Without the ability to introduce evidence of “prior acts,”
these new domestic violence laws lose their bite and intended effect. Sentencing
will be enhanced for repeat offenders who are prosecuted successfully, but the
evidence of these prior acts will never be presented to the jury for consideration.
The ultimate goals of “holding batterers accountable” and “recognizing domestic
violence as a course of conduct crime” will not be realized by the law as it
(2) To fear bodily injury or to fear bodily injury to a member of that person’s
immediate family; or
(3) To fear death or to fear the death of a member of that person’s immediate
family.
Id. § 210.
121. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 211-A (Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of domestic violence reckless conduct if: (A) The person violates section 211 and the
victim is a family or household member . . . .” Under section 211, “[a] person is guilty of reckless
conduct if he recklessly creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person.” Id. § 211.
122. Interview with Katherine Tierney, Assistant District Attorney, Domestic Violence Division,
Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office (Nov. 5, 2008). See also Jen Lynds, Two Men Going to
Jail for Assault in Separate Cases, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 19, 2008, at B2; Ann S. Kim, Man
Charged with Criminal Threatening, Domestic Violence, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 28, 2008,
available at http://news.mainetoday.com/updates/037621.html.
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 207-A, 209-A, 210-B, 210-C, 211-A.
124. 508 A.2d 123 (Me. 1986).
125. Id. at 128.
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currently exists.
V. MAINE RULE OF EVIDENCE 404
A. Exceptions Articulated by Rule 404(b)
According to Maine’s Rule of Evidence 401, “relevant evidence” is defined as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”126 Additionally, all relevant evidence is deemed
admissible unless prohibited by another rule of evidence or by the Maine or federal
Constitution.127 The Law Court reinforced this principle in 2006, holding in State
v. Allen that “[a]ll facts which tend to prove or disprove the matter at issue or
which constitute a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence with respect to the
act charged are relevant and should be admissible into evidence within judicial
discretion unless excluded by some rule or principle of law.”128 Furthermore, under
Maine law, trial court judges have “broad discretion to determine whether proffered
evidence is relevant.”129
Admitting prior acts evidence on non-character theories has proven nearly
impossible for the state’s prosecutors in domestic-violence-related non-homicide
prosecutions. Judges are hesitant to admit such evidence, even if prosecutors
present clearly articulated exceptions to the general prohibition against prior acts
evidence. The barrier that prosecutors face is Maine Rule of Evidence 404 (“Rule
404”), which presents a general ban on character-based evidence.130 In particular,
Rule 404(b) places an express ban on prior acts evidence being used to prove action
“in conformity” with a defendant’s character, with a few delineated exceptions.131
According to the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 404, “This rule is not based on
lack of relevancy but rather because the danger of prejudice (‘he’s a bad man, so he
is probably guilty’) outweighs the probative value.”132 The Advisory Committee
also determined that Rule 404(b) “does not exclude the evidence [of prior acts]
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”133
These exceptions “do not reflect the realities of domestic violence,”134 which
encompasses a wide range of violent and controlling acts. The non-character
permissible uses under Rule 404(b) require factual similarity to a degree that does
not arise from most domestic violence situations. For example, for a prior act to be
126. ME. R. EVID. 401.
127. ME. R. EVID. 402.
128. 2006 ME 20, ¶ 18, 892 A.2d 447, 453 (quoting State v. Brown, 321 A.2d 478, 482 (Me. 1974))
(emphasis added).
129. Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16, ¶ 20, 745 A.2d 378, 386 (citation omitted).
130. ME. R. EVID. 404.
131. ME. R. EVID. 404(b). See also ME. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
132. ME. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.
133. Id.
134. Kovach, supra note 30, at 1129 (quoting Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law’s Complicity
in Intimate Violence Against Women, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 773, 819 (1997)). See also Lewis, supra
note 43, at 48 (arguing that most courts do not perceive expert testimony in domestic violence cases as
violative of the evidentiary rules against character propensity evidence).
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admissible under the theory of intent, the mental state of the defendant must be in
dispute and the prior act and the prosecuted act must be sufficiently similar to
support the inference that “the defendant probably harbor[ed] the same intent in
each instance.”135 Although acts of domestic violence are generally part of the
same cycle to gain power and control over the batterer’s victim, they do not often
share a degree of similarity sufficient to satisfy admissibility under the theory of
intent. Additionally, the identity exception, along with most of the other
exceptions under Rule 404(b), is not of particular value in domestic violence
prosecutions, as the identity of the perpetrator, as well as his motive, is generally
not an issue in dispute.
Another stumbling block that prosecutors face when attempting to persuade
judges to admit prior acts under non-character theories is the requisite Rule 403
“balancing test.”136 In the off chance that a judge would consider admitting
evidence of a prior act of domestic violence, she must weigh the probative effect of
such evidence against its potential of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. If
the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value, the evidence may
be excluded under Rule 403. In performing this balancing test, the court takes into
consideration the need for the evidence, alternative methods of proof, and
remoteness in time to the action being prosecuted.137 Although such trial court
Rule 403 determinations will be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion,138
the Rule 403 hurdle at the trial level is difficult to clear. In domestic violence
cases, because of the highly prejudicial nature of prior acts evidence, such evidence
tends to be excluded, even if it surmounts the Rule 404(b) exclusionary barrier.
Accordingly, “[b]ecause of the accessibility of propensity inferences from evidence
of prior acts, evidence of either acts which resemble the act in question or acts
which carry with them overall negative connotations calls for the court to exercise
special caution in admitting such evidence even for limited purposes under general
rubrics, such as intent, motive and relationship.”139 In addition, the Law Court’s
policy on the rules of evidence, is that if there is any doubt regarding the
admissibility of evidence, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the
defendant.140 The general trend, therefore, is to exclude even highly relevant
evidence of prior acts if it risks prejudicing the jury against the defendant for the
particular crime charged.
Appellate courts in all states remain fearful of other crimes’ evidence and continue
to impose a number of substantive and procedural restrictions on its admission.
Restrictions are particularly placed on the trial courts’ role in making the
135. People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 770 (Cal. 1994) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
136. See ME. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”). According to the advisory committee’s note, “The trial judge has broad discretion in
determining whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or
confusion of issues or by sheer waste of time.” ME. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
137. Id.
138. State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me. 1981).
139. RICHARD H. FIELD & PETER L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE, § 404.4 at 143 (6th ed. 2007)
(internal quotations omitted).
140. State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1324 (Me. 1981).
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preliminary determination of admissibility and in instructing the jury as to the
141
appropriate use of the evidence.

As a result, courts seem to err on the side of caution and refuse to admit prior acts
evidence in a close call situation, or, in most domestic violence prosecutions, refuse
to admit such evidence at all.
B. Maine “Prior Acts” Jurisprudence from the 1800s to the Present
The oftentimes conflicting history of Maine’s Rule 404(b) jurisprudence has
left many prosecutors feeling as though they cannot introduce prior acts evidence in
domestic violence prosecutions at all. As derived from the common law, first
articulated in State v. Tozier,142 in 1862, Rule 404(b) stands for the proposition that
the state in a criminal action cannot introduce in its case-in-chief evidence of the
“bad character” of the accused.143 The rule, the holding explains, is not based on
irrelevancy but rather is a safeguard against the danger of prejudice outweighing
the evidence’s probative value.144 This jurisprudence has had a disproportionate
impact on domestic violence prosecutions in the state, as “the cycles of violence
and the power dynamics in abusive relationships dramatically affect the quality and
quantity, as well as the type of evidence available in domestic violence cases.”145
In State v. Pike,146 a 1876 case before the Law Court, in which a husband was
found guilty for the killing of his wife, Margaret, “by seizing and dragging her by
the hair of her head, and throwing her with force and violence upon a sofa, giving
her mortal wounds, of which she died,” the court held that evidence of other acts of
abuse during the night in question were properly admitted during Pike’s trial.147
However, the court noted, “[I]t is undoubtedly true . . . that neither proof of another
distinct felony, nor proof of another distinct assault upon [Margaret] was
admissible.”148 The evidence in this case, the court reasoned, was “not of that
description. It was limited to acts of violence on the same evening, and only a
short time before [Margaret’s] death.”149 The temporal element between the
particularized “incidents” of the crime was dispositive: As the events were so close
in time, the court construed them to be part of the same event, namely, the eventual
killing of Margaret Pike. The court stated quite clearly, however, that if the
incidents were “distinct assaults,” apart from the night in question, the court would
not admit such evidence.150
In the 1951 case of State v. Hume,151 a larceny prosecution, the Law Court
decided that “[r]elevant evidence to support a charge may be received within the
court’s discretion although it may tend to show that the respondent committed
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Domestic Violence Prac. & Proc., supra note 44, at 7-74.
49 Me. 404 (1862).
Id. at 405.
See generally id.
Domestic Violence Prac. & Proc., supra note 44, at 7-67.
65 Me. 111 (1876).
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113-14.
146 Me. 129, 78 A.2d 496 (1951).
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another offense not charged or that the acts charged are part of a common
scheme.”152 While this holding sounds promising in leaving open the possibility
that judicial discretion alone could determine the admissibility of uncharged acts in
a prosecution, upon closer inspection, the court focused on the fact that the
evidence was introduced by the defendant’s attorney, as opposed to the state
prosecutor.153 However, the effect of the court’s holding is procedural, not
substantive. According to the court, the analysis of admissibility would change
drastically if the prosecutor had attempted to introduce the evidence of the prior act
in his case-in-chief.154
Nearly two decades later, the Law Court proclaimed that “[e]vidence that is
otherwise competent and relevant to prove a [d]efendant’s guilt of the particular
crime charged is not made inadmissible by the fact that it also, but incidentally,
tends to prove him guilty of another distinct crime.”155 Also in 1971, the court
decided, in State v. Smith:
Where the acts showing the commission of the substantive offense of the crime
against nature were all so closely related in point of time and place and so
intimately associated with the acts evidencing the offense charged that they
formed together a continuous transactional episode, the whole event could be
shown, including what immediately preceded and what immediately followed the
156
act complained of, for the purpose of showing the intent of the accused.

The close temporal proximity of events in the court’s 1973 decision in State v.
Eaton157 proved to be the fulcrum upon which the court’s reasoning turned in
admitting prior acts, seemingly unrelated, into a prosecution for assault with a
dangerous weapon with intent to kill.158 The defendant contended that the trial
judge committed reversible error when he admitted into evidence “numerous
threats made by [the defendant] to a number of persons other than [the victim].”159
According to the court, “Where the intent of a party is an ingredient of the crime
charged, evidence of conduct of a similar nature may be introduced to establish the
intent of the defendant . . . .”160 The court continued to explain, “The previous
threats and assaults in the instant case were part of a single set of circumstances,
closely related in nature and time, all linked together by a common purpose . . .
.”161 Because the court could not tease out the ultimate crime from the context in
which it was committed, it decided to admit all evidence of the night’s events.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Law Court reiterated its commitment to
the general prohibition provided by Rule 404(b): evidence of prior bad acts is not
admissible against a criminal defendant if its sole purpose and relevance is to

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 140, 78 A.2d at 503 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 136-37, 78 A.2d at 501.
Id. at 137, 78 A.2d at 501.
State v. Castonguay, 263 A.2d 727, 729-30 (Me. 1970).
277 A.2d 481, 491 (Me. 1971).
309 A.2d 334 (Me. 1973).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 339.
Id.
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demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.162 However, in a 1982
murder prosecution,163 the Law Court held that the trial judge properly admitted
evidence of a defendant’s prior beating of his victim and chasing of the victim with
a knife, in order to allow the prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant
committed the murder knowingly or intentionally.164 As the court’s reasoning has
rarely been replicated in domestic violence prosecution appeals since, it is useful to
read that portion of the court’s decision in full:
Over defense objection, the court allowed a prosecution witness to testify that in
the summer of 1979 she once heard Valentine beat Tripp for an hour. The witness
testified that during the beating Valentine would stop to smoke or fix a drink and
then continue hitting Tripp. Following this incident, Valentine said: “She was
damn lucky I wasn’t wearing my knife. I reached for it and it was gone.” Another
witness, again over objection, testified that on June 30, 1980, Valentine, who was
apparently intoxicated, chased Tripp up a street with a knife. After Tripp escaped,
Valentine gave the knife to the witness and said: “I was going to kill the bitch.”
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to prove that a defendant acted on a
particular occasion in conformity with his past behavior. . . . When such conduct
was directed at the victim of the crime the evidence may be admissible, however,
to prove motive or intent. . . . Here, the State initially sought to prove Valentine’s
conduct was knowing or intentional. Accordingly, intent was in issue at trial and
165
the evidence was properly admitted.

Here, not only was the time lapse between these two beatings and the ultimate
murder of the victim significant (from more than a year to a few months before the
murder itself), the court allowed the evidence of the beatings in with no more
corroboration than the witnesses’ sworn testimony.166 The courts, both the Law
Court and the trial court, relied on the articulated exceptions under Rule 404(b) to
admit the probative evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of abuse.167
Additionally, in 1984, the Law Court clarified its State v. Bourgeois168 decision
that the main issue “is whether there is some sort of logical or experiential ‘nexus’
between the prior acts and the act charged other than a general propensity on the
part of the defendant to commit such acts.”169 In Bourgeois, evidence of the
defendant’s violent acts against his former wife were not admissible in a
prosecution concerning the attempted murder of his current wife.170 Though in
child sexual abuse prosecutions (see below) the court will uphold the admission of
evidence of prior acts between the defendant and a third party, in domestic violence
and other prosecutions, the evidentiary nexus has been held to be insufficient.
The Law Court held in 1988 in State v. Hezick171 that the trial court’s
162. See State v. Cyr, 389 A.2d 834 (Me. 1978); State v. Wallace, 431 A.2d 613 (Me. 1981).
163. State v. Valentine, 443 A.2d 573 (Me. 1982).
164. Id. at 578.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 639 A.2d 634 (Me. 1994).
169. FIELD & MURRAY, supra note 139, § 404.8, at 153. See also Bourgeois, 639 A.2d at 636-37
(quoting State v. Shuman, 622 A.2d 716, 718 (Me. 1993)).
170. Bourgeois, 639 A.2d at 637.
171. 539 A.2d 207 (Me. 1988).
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“exclusion of evidence about a separate protection-from-abuse proceeding against
[the defendant] fell well within the scope of the presiding justice’s discretion to
assess relevancy of proffered evidence.”172 In the 1991 Law Court decision of
State v. Nile,173 the court decided that evidence of prior acts against a victim could
be admissible for the limited purpose of allowing the jury to consider the victim’s
“state of mind at the time these alleged events were happening . . . .”174 The
defendant in this case was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and witness
tampering in a prosecution for crimes he committed against his estranged wife.175
The court argued that the victim’s state of mind was relevant in proving that she
was threatened and coerced into the defendant’s car, and that the evidence of his
prior abuse of her was introduced “for the very limited purpose” of demonstrating
her state of mind.176 That same year the Law Court also decided that evidence of
other wrongful acts could be admissible to demonstrate that a defendant had the
requisite intent to harass the subject of a protection from harassment order.177
In an arson prosecution in 1992, the court expanded the bounds of what
“relationship” meant in order to admit prior acts of vandalism. 178 Drawing upon its
1989 decision in State v. Giovanini,179 the Law Court decided that “the vandalism
evidence was probative on the crucial issue of the perpetrator of the arson, and was
admitted on that issue to show the relationship between [the defendant] and [the
victim] and that [the defendant] had a motive to burn [the victim’s] home.”180 The
court decided that a vandalism on the victim’s car two weeks before the arson
established a relationship between the accused and the victim.181 The court seemed
to rely on the temporal proximity between the two acts, rather than the substantial
similarity between the acts, to uphold the evidence’s admissibility.
A 1993 domestic-violence-based prosecution for attempted murder and
aggravated assault and its subsequent convictions were upheld by the Law Court.
In State v. Shuman,182 the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s threats
against his wife and children, even though his violent act was directed at another
man. “Similar threats or acts against others are relevant if there is a sufficient
nexus between the evidence sought to be introduced and the elements of the crime
charged,” wrote the court.183 The court added that the threat of undue prejudice
was “ameliorated by the lack of evidence that [the defendant] made any effort to
carry out his threat to his wife, the evidence of his later, non-threatening
conversation with his wife, and the time lag between the statement and the assault

172. Id.
173. 595 A.2d 1047 (Me. 1991).
174. Id. at 1049 (internal quotations omitted).
175. Id. at 1047.
176. Id. at 1049.
177. State v. Ilsley, 595 A.2d 421, 423-24 (Me. 1991).
178. State v. Webber, 613 A.2d 375 (Me. 1992).
179. 567 A.2d 1345, 1346 (Me. 1989) (“We have upheld the admission of prior acts to show the
relationship between the parties and the defendant’s motive, intent or opportunity.”).
180. Webber, 613 A.2d at 377.
181. Id.
182. 622 A.2d 716 (Me. 1993).
183. Id. at 718.
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on [the victim.]”184 Domestic abuse evidence was, therefore, admitted in a
connected, but non-domestic-violence-specific prosecution.
However, in 1997, the court held in State v. Jordan that the trial court
committed reversible error when it allowed testimony about harassing phone calls
from the defendant to his estranged wife.185 The trial court allowed a witness to
testify “in detail that [the defendant] had made fifteen or twenty harassing phone
calls, that he had followed her in a vehicle and nearly ran her off the road, and that
he had stalked her.”186 However, the current case against the defendant did not
involve his estranged wife directly, as he was convicted of reckless conduct with
the use of a firearm against a police officer.187 “[T]he evidence of [the defendant’s]
prior bad acts directed against his wife had no probative value in proving his guilt
of the later crime committed against someone else and, therefore, the court erred in
admitting [his estranged wife’s] testimony,” wrote the court.188
In a more recent decision, the Law Court upheld the murder conviction of a
defendant over his objection that prior acts evidence concerning an incident of
domestic violence was improperly admitted at his trial.189 The court reasoned:
At trial, the prosecution claimed that the killing of [the victim] was intentional.
The testimony that [the defendant] had previously engaged in an act of domestic
violence toward [the victim] by kicking in the locked front door of their home
causing the door to strike her in the head, was offered to prove the absence of
mistake or accident as to the murder and is, therefore, admissible under Rule
404(b). Further, the trial court acted within its discretion in applying Rule 403 and
concluding that this evidence was not so prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its
190
probative value.

This decision seems to align itself with other evidence rulings in murder
prosecutions. Because the probative value of the evidence in a murder prosecution
will rarely be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, evidence of prior
acts—under a recognized and well-articulated Rule 404(b) exception—will often
be admitted. In lesser crimes, however, the potential prejudicial effect of such
evidence increases, whereas the “need” for the evidence decreases, resulting in
judges being much more willing to exclude any prior acts evidence from the
purview of the jury.
Most recently, in State v. Dilley, the Law Court upheld the manslaughter
convictions of Jon Dilley, who killed his mother and estranged wife.191 On appeal,
Dilley alleged that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning statements
he made to a co-worker about killing his wife.192 The court stated: “In criminal
trials involving an intent element, we have repeatedly held that evidence of the
prior relationship between the accused and the victim is relevant and admissible to
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
1997 ME 101, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 929, 931.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 7, 694 A.2d at 931.
Id.
State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 37, 830 A.2d 433, 446.
Id.
2008 ME 5, ¶ 1, 938 A.2d 804, 806.
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establish the accused’s motive, intent, or opportunity to commit the crime, or to
demonstrate the absence of any mistake or accident.”193 The court continued: “If
the evidence regarding the accused’s relationship to the victim concerns events that
arose a significant amount of time before the crime, that remoteness in time
generally goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.”194 If the
prosecution, as was done in Dilley, presents evidence of prior acts relating to the
intent element of the crime charged, the Law Court consistently holds that such
acts—at least in homicide prosecutions—are admissible over Rule 404 and Rule
403 objections.
The Law Court’s jurisprudence of the admissibility of prior acts is largely
dependent upon the type of prosecution in which the evidence is being offered.
Generally, in homicide prosecutions, because the risk of prejudice is diminished, at
least theoretically, by the enormity of the crime alleged, judges do not hesitate to
admit a wide variety of prior acts evidence under articulated Rule 404(b)
exceptions.
C. Evidence Rulings in the Sexual Assault and Child Sexual Abuse Contexts
Whereas Maine’s lower courts and the Law Court have been hesitant to allow
the admission of prior acts evidence, there is one context in which the courts have
been consistent: the admission of prior acts evidence in sexual assault and child
sexual abuse cases. Though there is no official rule regarding admissibility in these
types of prosecutions—unlike in federal law, in which the Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 explicitly allow for the admissibility of prior
convictions and uncharged acts in sex crimes195—the state courts have admitted
193. Id. ¶ 30, 938 A.2d at 811 (citing State v. Roman, 622 A.2d 96, 98-99 (Me. 1993); State v.
Young, 560 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Me. 1989); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1201 (Me. 1977)).
194. Id. On the federal side of things, the United States District Court for the District of Maine held
in 1984 that several factors are to be considered by judges in determining the admissibility of prior acts
into evidence, including the “force of the Government’s demonstration of need for the evidence,” the
“strength of the evidence of prior acts,” the “persuasive or probative force of the other acts evidence,”
and the “risk of prejudice that will be occasioned by the admission of the prior acts evidence.” United
States v. Kenney, 598 F. Supp. 883, 887 (D. Me. 1984). The court wrote, “[U]se of prior acts evidence
to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context is proper as where it is used
to prove that the charged acts are part and parcel of a continuing course of similar criminal activity.” Id.
at 889 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
195. FED. R. EVID. 413-15. In 1995, the United States Congress approved three new rules of
evidence that allow for the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence for character-propensity purposes in
federal cases involving sexual assault or child molestation. Id. Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415 recognize that in sex crimes the probative value of prior acts evidence outweighs its potential
prejudicial effect. See id. However, these Federal Rules of Evidence have come under heavy criticism
in academic circles and among defense attorneys, in particular. See, e.g., Rosanna Cavallaro, Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Struggle for Rulemaking Preeminence, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2007); R. Wade King, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the
Public’s Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move Too Far Toward
Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather Than Guilt?, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167 (2002);
Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going To Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual
Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1996); Aviva Orenstein,
Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1487 (2005); Jeffrey Waller, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: “Laws Are Like Medicine; They
Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser . . . Evil,” 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1503 (1999). Despite the
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such evidence largely under the “relationship” or “intent” exceptions in Rule
404(b). The Law Court has affirmed, in several instances, the admission of
evidence of prior acts to demonstrate the existence of a “relationship” between the
accused and the victim.
According to the authors of Maine’s treatise on evidence:
The rubric of “relationship” can be extended to allow the admission of a wide
range of evidence that otherwise would be barred by [Rule 404(b)]. The theory is
that the prior conduct supports inferences of the existence of a relationship
between the actor and some other person that is relevant either to an issue in the
196
case or the credibility of a witness.

The authors also seem skeptical that “[a]lthough the evidence was ostensibly
offered and admitted to show the defendant’s ‘intent’ or the ‘relationship’ between
the parties, those issues do not appear to have been of actual importance in the
cases.”197 Even accompanied by limiting instructions as to the relevance of such
prior acts evidence, the authors question the propriety of the admission of the
evidence as “its real probative force seems quite close to the inference that the
defendant acted in conformity with those past actions on the occasion(s) in question
at trial—precisely the inference Rule 404 is intended to block.”198
In the 1958 decision State v. Seaburg,199 the Law Court announced that it had
“held that in an indecent liberties prosecution proof of prior acts of a nature similar
to the principal offense charged in the indictment is admissible.”200 In Seaburg, the
trial judge allowed testimony about games of strip poker between the victim and
the defendant as relevant to explain their relationship.201 In its 1986 decision State
v. Adams,202 the Law Court held that evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual
misconduct over a six-year period was admissible to show motive, intent, or
opportunity in the present crime and was not overly prejudicial to force its
exclusion.203 Similarly, in State v. Ouellette,204 the Law Court held that, in a
prosecution for sexual misconduct, it was not abuse of discretion to permit the
prosecution “to elicit testimony concerning sexual episodes between [the
defendant] and the victim that were not charged in the indictment in order to show
the relationship between them.”205 In its 1992 State v. Smith206 decision, the Law
Court upheld the admission of the victim’s testimony concerning prior acts of
controversy, federal district courts and circuit courts, since the adoption of the rules, consistently have
upheld convictions of sexual offenders whose guilt was determined, in part, by the admission of prior
acts evidence.
196. FIELD & MURRAY, supra note 139, § 404.7, at 149.
197. Id. § 404.5, at 146.
198. Id.
199. 154 Me. 162, 145 A.2d 550 (1958).
200. Id. at 171, 145 A.2d at 555.
201. Id.
202. 513 A.2d 854 (Me. 1986).
203. Id. at 856.
204. 544 A.2d 761 (Me. 1988). See also State v. Nadeau, 653 A.2d 408, 411 (Me. 1995) (holding
that evidence of prior sexual acts was admissible to show motive, intent, or opportunity to commit the
charged offense).
205. Ouellette, 544 A.2d at 763.
206. 612 A.2d 231 (Me. 1992).

378

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

violence against her on the ground that such evidence went to the issue of
compulsion in a gross sexual assault case.207 The Law Court further held that the
prosecutors were allowed to demonstrate through this evidence that the victim had
submitted out of fear based on these prior incidents.208 Because the details of the
prior incidents were vague, the Law Court found that this minimized the potential
prejudicial effect under Rule 403.209
In an even greater stretch of the bounds of the Rule 404(b) exceptions, in State
v. Thompson,210 the Law Court upheld the trial court’s decision to allow evidence
of the defendant’s prior bad acts involving only one of two sex-offense victims to
be used in charges involving only the other victim.211 Thus, prior uncharged acts
against another person were deemed admissible for the prosecution of an offense
not involving that particular victim. In a recent case involving a juvenile sex
offender, the Law Court upheld the admission of evidence of “[p]ast, uncharged
acts between a defendant and complainant [as admissible to demonstrate the]
defendant’s intent to commit the crime with which he is charged.”212 These two
cases highlight the general trend of the Law Court to allow prior acts evidence in
sexual assault prosecutions if introduced under the “relationship” exception of Rule
404(b).
However, in a child sexual abuse prosecution, State v. Palmer,213 the Law
Court held that evidence of prior acts cannot be admitted solely as “background
information.”214 Notably, it was evidence of past physical abuse of the victim’s
mother that was, in the opinion of the court, improperly admitted.215 The mother
had testified at trial that while she was in the process of divorcing the defendant,
she had, along with her children, spent time in an abused women’s shelter.216 The
Law Court reasoned that “[a]lthough evidence about other crimes, wrongs, or acts
of a defendant may be admitted . . . , it is not admissible as background
information.”217 The effect of this information was not considered to be harmless,
and thus the court vacated the judgment against the defendant.218 The net that the
Law Court has cast for the admissibility of prior acts in sexual assault prosecutions
is wide. However, the Law Court has foreclosed as a possibility attempts to admit
the defendant’s prior acts against third parties as a part of the prosecutor’s case-inchief.
Within the realm of sexual abuse prosecutions, particularly if there is a child
involved, the Law Court has demonstrated its willingness to expand the bounds of
admissible prior acts evidence as demonstrated by the preceding cases. There is an
important lesson to learn from this: Establishing a “relationship” between the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
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accused and his victim is an important exception to the general ban against prior
acts evidence by Rule 404(b). Crimes involving sexual abuse are different, the
Law Court seems to acknowledge, and thus, in such sexually-based prosecutions,
the court adheres to a broad admissibility of prior acts evidence standard.
D. Maine Prosecutors’ View of “Prior Acts” Admissibility
While the Law Court is the ultimate authority as to whether and when prior
acts evidence may be admissible against a criminal defendant, it is the state’s
prosecutors who most acutely feel the effects of the trial courts’ decisions regarding
evidence admissibility. And while the Law Court decisions represent only the
smallest slice of criminal cases in the state, it is the district attorneys who can
provide the most complete picture of how evidence admissibility affects their
prosecution of domestic-violence-related crimes. District attorneys from across the
state completed an Author-generated survey in the fall of 2008 in which they were
asked to detail their views on the admissibility of prior acts evidence in domesticviolence-related prosecutions.219 Their answers, despite experience and geographic
differences, were rather uniform.
The prosecutor survey respondents all commented that they rarely, if ever,
attempt to introduce prior acts evidence in a domestic violence prosecution.
Deputy District Attorney for Aroostook County Carrie L. Linthicum remarked, “In
cases where the defendant has a prior similar offense, which is a lot of the cases,
not one of our judges (two District Court and one Superior Court) will allow
evidence of prior assault or similar convictions to be entered into evidence.”220
Assistant District Attorney Todd Collins remarked that while such acts are relevant
and used at sentencing, they are “generally inadmissible” in his experience at
trial.221 Three assistant district attorneys from Penobscot County remarked that
admitting prior acts of domestic violence under the Maine Rules of Evidence would
be “impermissible.”222 Assistant District Attorney Katherine Tierney, a prosecutor
in the Domestic Violence Unit in Cumberland County, remarked that while prior
acts could be admissible for the limited purpose of demonstrating the victim’s
sense of fear in a terrorizing, threatening, or stalking prosecution, they are excluded
generally from other types of domestic-violence-related prosecutions.223 The end
result, these prosecutors agree, is that despite some favorable case law, they do not
attempt to introduce prior acts evidence in the vast majority, if not all, of their
domestic violence prosecutions for fear of exclusion, wasting time, or, according to
one prosecutor, making the judge angry, which will not help the prosecution’s

219. I developed a survey that was sent to district attorneys across the state, focusing on their
experiences with domestic violence prosecutions and Rule 404(b) exceptions. The following responses
were generated from that survey.
220. Survey of Carrie L. Linthicum, Deputy District Attorney, Aroostook County, in Presque Isle,
Me. [hereinafter Survey of Linthicum] (Oct. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
221. Survey of Todd Collins, Assistant District Attorney, Aroostook County, in Caribou, Me. (Oct.
31, 2008) (on file with author).
222. Survey of Assistant District Attorneys, Penobscot County, in Bangor, Me. [hereinafter Survey
of Penobscot County] (Oct. 30, 2008) (on file with author).
223. Interview with Tierney, supra note 122.
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The prosecutors similarly agreed that uncooperative victims are the singlemost insurmountable barrier to successful convictions in domestic violence cases.
Linthicum remarked, “The admissibility of priors is the least of our concerns since
we know they won’t be admitted.”225 However, according to A.D.A. Tierney,
allowing the jury to hear evidence of prior acts of violence against the victim could
go a long way in helping the jury understand the context of the relationship and
why the victim is not testifying on her own behalf. 226 “We need to have these prior
acts in order to show why [the victim] would be scared of retaliation by the
defendant,” said Tierney.227 She added that prosecutors, if allowed to, should use
their discretion in deciding which prior acts of abuse should be admitted during
trial. “These acts would be used to show a course of conduct of putting the victim
in fear,” said Tierney. “You wouldn’t need ten years of atrocities to accomplish
that.”228 Tierney said that while she is bringing charges under the new domestic
violence laws of the criminal code, these crimes have not made admitting evidence
about prior acts of domestic violence easier. “There’s tons of abuse,” she said.229
Particularly in “no-drop” or “evidenced-based” prosecutorial districts,230 of
which Cumberland County is officially and Aroostook County is in practice, the
admissibility of prior acts evidence could increase the success rates of prosecution
dramatically. Tierney remarked that, “After Davis, getting excited utterances and
other hearsay-type evidence admitted when the victim is not there to testify has
gotten even harder. We are limited as to what we can do without more evidence,
given the victim’s unavailability.”231 Linthicum remarked that the end result of
victim recantation is that the office will “opt for deferred dispositions or long
continuances for the defendant to engage in counseling in hopes that he will not
repeat the behavior. Sometimes the magic works, sometimes it doesn’t.”232 In a
prosecution district like Penobscot County, where there is not a “no-drop” domestic
violence prosecution policy in place, prosecutors cannot bring charges against the
defendant if the victim recants or there is no corroborating evidence to support the
charge itself.233 According to one assistant district attorney, this can result in
dropping a more serious charge—assault, threatening, reckless conduct—to
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor that rarely results in any jail time.234
In essence, prosecutors are being prevented from successfully and fully
prosecuting domestic violence defendants because their evidence base may not be
enough to prove the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Rule 404(b), in
224. Survey of Linthicum, supra note 220.
225. Id.
226. Interview with Tierney, supra note 122.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. “Evidence-based” prosecutions, or a “no-drop” policy, are those in which “the victim’s
testimony [is] no longer the sole or primary source of evidence,” and the prosecutions “proceed[]
regardless of the victim’s wishes.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 315.
231. Id.
232. Survey of Linthicum, supra note 220.
233. Survey of Penobscot County, supra note 222.
234. Id.
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their opinions, has provided a systematic and often insurmountable barrier to
presenting relevant, probative evidence of the battering relationship to the jury.
According to Tierney, the A.D.A. knows about the defendant’s history; the judge
knows about the history; it affects what prosecutors charge and how judges
sentence. But the jury can never hear of it.235 The arguably most important actors
in the criminal justice process, the jury members, are deprived of having a more
complete and accurate picture of the domestic violence course of conduct through
the overly draconian utilization of Rule 404(b) to exclude evidence of prior acts.
In the domestic violence context, prosecutors must make the preliminary
decision concerning the charge they seek against a particular offender. They must
take into account several factors, the most important of which is usually the
strength of the evidence against the defendant for the crime charged. If prosecutors
were confident that the evidence of prior acts of domestic violence would be
admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and his victim, they
would be more confident in bringing charges, even without victim testimony: a
classic barrier to successful domestic violence prosecutions. Maine’s prosecutors
have responded overwhelmingly that, given their knowledge of local judges’
tendencies in ruling against the admission of prior acts evidence, they have decided
not to attempt to introduce such evidence in the majority of situations. In domestic
violence prosecutions, this can prove fatal to the prosecution itself. Furthermore,
as the prosecutors have no ability to appeal the evidence admissibility decision of
the individual judge if the case ends in a plea or acquittal, the improper judicial
decision to exclude the evidence will never be reviewed. Ultimately, the Law
Court’s confusing jurisprudence on the admissibility of prior acts is wreaking
havoc on the ground: Prosecutors are not attempting to introduce prior acts
evidence, even with well-articulated (and non-exhaustive) exceptions under Rule
404(b). As a result, valuable evidence will never be presented to the jury, and,
perhaps more importantly given the rise of plea bargaining in the criminal justice
system, cannot be used as a bargaining chip during the course of plea negotiations
in having defendants plead to more appropriate charges for their domestic violencerelated conduct. More fundamentally, the particularized “frozen in time” discrete
instances of domestic violence that are currently being prosecuted are devoid of
context and lose much of their narrative power because they are presented divorced
from the relationship from which they emerge. The new criminal law code
amendments have done nothing to address this problem.
E. Has the Law Court Provided a Pathway to Admissibility?
Through its jurisprudence concerning Rule 404(b), the Law Court has proven
itself conflicted over the issue of prior acts evidence admissibility, to say the least.
In many instances, the court has upheld the conviction of criminal defendants
against whom evidence of prior acts was admitted at trial. It has done so for
different reasons: the articulated exception to Rule 404(b) was recognized as valid;
the evidence itself was not so prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its probative
value under Rule 403; admitting such evidence was not “clear error” by the trial

235. Interview with Tierney, supra note 122.
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court; or the error stemming from the evidence’s admission was “harmless.” In
many other instances, however, the Law Court has held that admission of prior acts
evidence was too prejudicial to be admitted, or did not fit neatly into a clearly
delineated exception to the general ban against prior acts evidence. Oftentimes, it
appears that the court’s decision-making as to the propriety of the trial court’s
decision to admit prior acts evidence has been determined by the severity and type
of crime charged. In homicide prosecutions, the court has proven itself much more
amenable to the admission of even inflammatory prejudicial prior acts evidence.
Additionally, in sexual abuse prosecutions, trial judge discretion largely remains
untouched by the Law Court in admitting a wide variety of prior acts evidence
under the rubric of “relationship” or “intent.”
This has led to a contradictory and confusing state of affairs, and has made
prosecutors unsure about when and whether to attempt to introduce prior acts
evidence at trial. The Law Court needs to provide clarity to prosecutors and,
perhaps more importantly, to the Maine District and Superior Court judges and
justices who confront these issues of admissibility daily. Within the realm of
domestic violence prosecutions, clarity could mean the difference between a
dropped charge and an adjudication or a finding of “not guilty” and a conviction.
The stakes are remarkably high when it comes to domestic violence prior acts
admissibility. The Law Court has a tremendous opportunity to amend the Maine
Rules of Evidence to allow explicitly for the introduction of prior acts evidence in
domestic violence prosecutions when those prior acts elucidate the relationship
between the defendant and his victim as well as the context of battering from which
the charges stem.
VI. AMENDING MAINE’S RULES OF EVIDENCE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN
CHARGING AND SENTENCING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS
Though several state legislatures have adopted statutory changes to their rules
of evidence to allow for prior acts of domestic violence to be admissible in criminal
prosecutions, these statutory schemes focus on the “propensity” of batterers to
commit acts of domestic violence.236 The proponents of such statutes argue largely
by analogy—batterers are like sexual offenders. They act by compulsion, they
cannot resist the urge to beat, and they are psychologically predisposed to harm
their loved ones. Arguing for the propensity purpose poses several distinct and
serious problems, namely in focusing on the pathology of the individual batterer
rather than the offense itself, as well as the fact that bending the rule for propensity
purposes flies in the face of the well-rooted foundations and rationales behind the
general character evidence ban. People should not be punished for who they are,
the saying goes, but rather for what they do.
The propensity rationale for prior acts admission in domestic violence
prosecutions is not what this Comment advocates. Rather, Maine’s Law Court
could look to its New England counterpart in Vermont, who has articulated within
236. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Ch. 267, 2007-08 Third Ex.
Sess., Prop. 99); AK R. EVID. 404(b)(4); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.27b (West, Westlaw through
2008 Act 268); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Ch. 1); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-6-801.5 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sess.).

2010]

OPPORTUNITY FOUND

383

the context of its decisions that admitting prior acts in domestic violence
prosecutions is allowable. In its 1998 decision of State v. Sanders,237 the Vermont
Supreme Court held in an appeal involving aggravated domestic assault that
evidence of prior incidents of domestic abuse was relevant to portray the history
surrounding the abusive relationship and thus was admissible.238 The facts
themselves were quite typical of a domestic assault prosecution. The assault itself
stemmed from a March 31, 1996, incident in which the victim was threatened with
a knife by her live-in boyfriend, who said, “[S]omeone is going to die . . . who’s it
gonna be?”239 The state prosecutors informed the defense that it would be
introducing two prior assaults upon the victim at trial.240 Over the defendant’s
motion in limine to exclude the acts, which included an incident when the
defendant choked the victim and bloodied her nose, the trial court admitted
evidence of both acts, even though the victim recanted on the stand her statements
to the police.241 The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of this
evidence.242 The court reasoned:
[W]e need not decide whether the prior bad acts may be admissible solely to show
fear or intent because the evidence was relevant also to portray the history
surrounding the abusive relationship, providing the needed context for the
behavior in issue. The purpose of establishing defendant’s history of abusing the
victim is not to show his general character for such abuse, but to provide the jury
243
with an understanding of defendant’s actions on the date in question.

The court continued to explain that:
Allegations of a single act of domestic violence, taken out of its situational
context, are likely to seem “incongruous and incredible” to a jury. . . . Without
knowing the history of the relationship between the defendant and the victim,
jurors may not believe the victim was actually abused, since domestic violence is
“learned, . . . controlling behavior aimed at gaining another’s compliance” through
244
multiple incidents.

The court also determined that prior acts of abuse were relevant to “put the victim’s
recantation of prior statements into context for the jury.”245 The court recognized
that:
Victims of domestic abuse are likely to change their stories out of fear of
retribution, or even out of misguided affection. . . . This prior history of abuse
gives the jury an understanding of why the victim is less than candid in her
testimony and allows them to decide more accurately which of the victim’s
246
statements more reliably reflect reality.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

716 A.2d 11 (Vt. 1998).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Sanders, 716 A.2d at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, without relying on propensity reasoning, the court held that prior acts of
abuse were relevant and necessary for the prosecution to paint a more complete and
accurate picture of the domestic violence on trial.247 The court focused on the
cyclical nature of domestic violence when determining admissibility of the prior
acts evidence rather than the propensity of the offender to commit violence.
Because Maine is facing a domestic violence crisis, the Law Court simply
cannot wait for the appropriate case to make its common law declaration, as did the
Vermont Supreme Court. Further, because prior acts evidence has largely been
excluded in non-homicide and non-sexual offense prosecutions, the question of the
admissibility of prior acts evidence in the context of the battering relationship may
never reach the court. The Law Court must be proactive; it must amend the Maine
Rules of Evidence.
However, rather than amend the text of Rule 404, the Law Court should amend
its advisors’ note, explaining when and how prior acts evidence could be relevant.
The new text, in order to allow prosecutors to introduce prior acts evidence
between the defendant and the victim in domestic violence prosecutions, would
read:
Subdivision (b) deals with evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Such
evidence is not admissible to prove character in order to show that a person acted
in conformity therewith. The subdivision does not exclude the evidence when
offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or, in
domestic violence-related crimes, to establish the context of the abusive
relationship. This listing of possible exceptions to the general prohibition on prior
248
acts evidence is not exhaustive.

The amendment would recognize that domestic violence crimes are different, and
that the state’s rules of evidence should reflect the particular cyclical nature of
domestic violence by allowing prior acts into evidence to give jurors the necessary
context of the relationship between the accused and the victim. The legislative
opportunity to criminalize domestic violence as a course of conduct crime has been
lost. In order to re-inject the evidentiary vitality of the originally proposed bill, the
Law Court should move to amend the articulated and recognized exceptions to
Rule 404(b). It should do so quickly and it should do so loudly, as a unified voice
against the domestic violence epidemic in Maine. In order to close the gap
between charging and sentencing, jurors should and must understand the context of
the battering relationship from which the particular charges emerge. This proposed
amendment would help close that gap.
VII. CONCLUSION
Commissioner of Maine’s Department of Public Safety Anne Jordan lamented
in 2009 that looking at domestic violence in Maine can “be very discouraging,

247. Id. The Vermont Supreme Court reaffirmed its Sanders holding, and its underlying rationale, in
State v. Hendricks, 787 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Vt. 2001).
248. ME. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note with the suggested changes underlined.
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because the arrests keep coming and the deaths keep occurring.”249 There exists a
disconnect in this state between the number of arrests and the increase in domestic
violence deaths. Somewhere between arrest and final adjudication, batterers are
not being held accountable for their actions. As such, they are not being subjected
to the heightened sentencing penalties that would help prevent them from returning
to their victims to continue their abuse, or, as is too often the case, to kill them.
This Comment seeks to convince the Law Court to take the lead on the
initiative to close the gap between arrests and deadly violence. Understanding that
domestic violence is a course of conduct crime is essential to its successful
criminalization in society. The crime of domestic violence does not comport well
with traditional evidence bans on prior acts, as domestic violence cannot be
reduced to a single isolated incident, divorced completely from its context.
Recognizing this, the efforts of dozens of lawyers, activists, and legislators were
combined to present a comprehensive bill to criminalize domestic violence. That
bill, however, was carved up into incident-specific crimes, eviscerating the intent
behind the bill and its intended potential effect and power. In an ironic and tragic
twist, the same year that Maine adopted these new “domestic violence” laws, it saw
an enormous increase in the number of domestic-violence-related deaths.250 The
disconnect between the reality of battering and the law that seeks to address the
problem has turned deadly.
Maine’s jurisprudence surrounding prior acts admissibility in criminal
prosecutions is spotty and inadequately deals with domestic violence. As it
currently stands, judicial discretion in much of the state trends toward excluding
evidence of prior acts in domestic violence cases as either banned by Rule 404(b)
or as overly prejudicial against the criminal defendant. As stated by Professor
Andrew King-Ries, “No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a crime the way
that the character evidence ban does with domestic violence. The character
evidence ban prevents the true nature of domestic violence from exposure to public
scrutiny and, therefore, sanctions and perpetuates domestic violence.”251 The issue
at hand is not the character of the defendant, but rather, the nature of domestic
violence itself. By essentially limiting prior acts evidence in domestic violence
homicide prosecutions or sexual abuse cases, the Law Court has, in essence, failed
to recognize the patterned course of conduct that marks domestic violence as
different from other crimes.
As a state, and as a society, we can no longer afford tacitly to accept domestic
violence through our unresponsive criminal law. If the original L.D. 1627 had
passed as it was envisioned, amending the state’s rules of evidence would be
unnecessary. However, as the code amendments do not and cannot reflect the
needs and realities of domestic violence victims in the criminal justice system,
something must be done. The Law Court must respond. Domestic violence must
be criminalized and prosecuted successfully in Maine if we are to ever stem the tide
249. David Hench, Domestic Violence: Progress, Problems; An Analysis Outlines the Areas Needing
Attention, Such as Services for Children Who See Abuse, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 25, 2009, at
B1.
250. Id.
251. Andrew King-Ries, True to Character: Honoring the Intellectual Foundations of the Character
Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313, 315 (2004).
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of unrelenting abuse against our women, our children, and our families. Amending
our rules of evidence could be an important step in that process.

